This paper firstly provides an ethnographic account of the dynamic of events in Geneva in 2004, when meetings of various multilateral agencies and global civil society organizations were held simultaneously to discuss the proposal to include the Development Agenda as a key element of intellectual property rights (IPR), seeking to insert some public policy aspects into the existing legal frameworks on IPR. Secondly we describe the historical context for the emergence of the intellectual property system as global legislation, explaining how it came into being and the ways in which it intertwines with international trade, examining the extent of its impact and its interfaces with various domains of social life, including culture and knowledge.
An Anthropology of the world economic system must inevitably address the legal frameworks that regulate the production of goods on the global market, as well as the production of ideas and knowledge, insofar as these too have been transformed into goods. The TRIPS Agreement has imposed a reorganization of the relations of production and trade at global level. Moreover it has induced a radical change within and between nations that produce science and technology and those that do not, but nevertheless require them.
Since the agencies responsible for regulating global trade, which includes intellectual property law, form part of the United Nations system, one of the vibrant v.11 n.2 o. f. leal, r. h. v. de souza, f. solagna most controversial topics when it comes to intellectual property issues have been the relations between Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and development. The main argument is that TRIPS-related patent laws and practices work against the interests of developing countries and need to be reformed.
The paper is divided into three sections. In the first we provide an ethnographic account of the events that took place in Geneva, Switzerland, Reflecting the typical dynamic of these global assemblies of nation states, the meeting took place in parallel with other events: meetings of national and regional member state delegations, meetings of experts from specialized international agencies, and a wide-range of global civil society conferences and summits, all held simultaneously in Geneva. The Development Agenda proposed by Brazil, as a WIPO member state, emerged in direct response to the intellectual property legislation and sought to establish various public policy aspects as an integral part of the IPR framework.
In the second section of the work, we present the context of the global intellectual property regime, examining how it formed and became intertwined with international trade, as well as the range of its impact, indicating its interfaces with diverse areas of social life, including knowledge production and culture.
In the final section of the article -which is based on data from interviews, documents and the minutes of multilateral agency meetings -we shift back to the main topic of our study, focusing our attention on the conclusion to the negotiation process for the WIPO Development Agenda in 2007, and describing the role of the main actors, namely the member states of the United Nations organizations. As Brazil assumed a lead role in proposing the Agenda in 2004, we examine the disputes that occurred during the construction of this process as the political actors oscillated back and forth in their support for the international system designed to protect and enforce intellectual property rights and the tensions generated as these rights themselves became seen as barriers to the trade and development of developing nations.
We followed the three-year negotiation process as direct observers from October 2004, when the proposal for the Development Agenda was first presented at the WIPO General Assembly, to October 2007, when the same Assembly finally adopted the consolidated Agenda unanimously. Our research included observation of events, interviewing key people, and collecting and analyzing the rich documentation available through the virtual libraries hosted on international agency websites. Needless to say, we take this production of discourses about intellectual property and development by this law-making agency not as a political breakthrough, but rather as an important moment in the reorganization of country alignments and the production of new realities within the global order. As Escobar (1995: 46) wrote concerning another context: "The invention of development necessarily involved the creation of an institutional field from which discourses are produced, recorded, stabilized, modified and put into circulation." Escobar's argument is that the development discourse creates the Third World as the other to be developed by the West. In the case analyzed here, though, we address the clash between two global discourses and their different mandates and constituencies: one about intellectual property, where ideas, knowledge and imagination are re-envisaged as privately-owned commodities to be commercialized within the global market; the other about development, rephrased in terms of public wealth and the right to access knowledge and technology.
The world in Geneva
The first proposal for the establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda was submitted by Argentina and Brazil at the 2004 WIPO General Assembly with the support of twelve other developing countries. This group of member states, coordinated by Brazil and naming itself the Group of Friends of Development, comprised South Africa, Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, Ecuador, Iran, Peru, Kenya, the Dominican Republic, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uruguay and Venezuela. In order to reconstruct what we identify as a turning point in the dynamic -or rather the discourse -between North and South (or to use the language of the multilateral agencies: between developed and developing countries), we explore some of the tensions between these actors and power groups and the overarching bureaucratic framework of multilateral organizations. It is our view thatindependent of the actual outcomes of the Agenda as a set of reform proposals, such as safeguarding public interest flexibilities in the international system of intellectual property rights and working towards more equitable trading conditions -the three-year process involved in negotiating the Agenda provides us with a unique opportunity to observe the multiple roles and asymmetrical relationships of different actors within a scenario of supranational law-making agencies involved in producing globalization.
Globalization means that decisions of interest to a particular collectivity are no longer taken either locally or nationally, but internationally by global supranational entities -the multilateral agencies -that overlay localized actors. On one hand, this has led to the emergence of a new sphere of social life located above all of us -including the nation state -and belonging to a broader systemic order capable of imposing its own interests through law.
On the other, it demands that local actors actively or passively adhere to this new legal regime. In the new global governance of production, which includes (especially) the ownership of ideas, the global and the local are reconfigured by a political economy of knowledge production. The context itself produces a narrative on the meanings of development, West, North and South, global and local. As various anthropologists -Abélès (2008), Appadurai (2001) , Fischer (2011) , among others -have pointed out, contemporary concerns in anthropology about translating and understanding cultural practices have abandoned traditional objects. Indeed, anthropological inquiry has shifted its attention to the global arena of policy making and to the conditions through which such political discourses or rituals of truth, to borrow Foucault's terminology, are produced.
By multilateral agencies we mean entities linked to the United Nations (UN) system, including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund, to mention just a few among the similarly structured entities, specialized agencies and affiliated organizations headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.
Our focus here is WIPO and its 2004 General Assembly, composed of 186 member states, which follows a UN representational governance system of one country, one vote. In any of these multilateral organizations, holding an Assembly, their main deliberative policy-making forum, generates an important dynamic involving other events and meetings occurring simultaneous to the main event. Although long speeches and voting decisions take place on the main floor of the Assembly, a building and room guarded with the highest security, everything else happens away from this space. Although the international rituals unfolding on the main stage are indeed very important, much of the decision-making process, disputes and consensus building very clearly unfolds elsewhere. Multiple formal and informal meetings are held in parallel to the main event: besides the sessions between member states and clusters of countries, these include celebrations, protests, media statements, sittings and civil society gatherings, all held simultaneously in the central space and its surroundings.
During these periods when the main agencies hold their assemblies, Geneva becomes a plethora of political rituals and the whole town is taken over by the thrill and expectation of the event, expressed in diverse languages and accents. Briefly, given the scope of this paper, we shall explore three This meeting took place in a venue across the street from the WIPO headquarters. A few members of the WIPO secretariat were also present at the civil society forum, invited to discuss "the future of the WIPO." They gave short talks, stressing that the primary mission of WIPO, as a technical agency and law-making body functioning as the "leading global forum for the promotion of intellectual property as a force for innovation and creativity," was to deliver capacity-building programs to help developing countries benefit from intellectual property legislation. The position of the WIPO officials was highly defensive given that the overall tone of the meeting -reiterated in all 1 TACD Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue is a forum of European and North American consumer organizations, run by Consumers International, with the aim of developing policy recommendations to foster consumer interest in policy making (see www.tacd.org).
its sessions -was critical of the legitimacy of WIPO's mandate as a UN agency.
The argument was that WIPO only became part of United Nations system in 1974, and has sided with intellectual property rights, its original function prior to becoming a multilateral agency, to the exclusion of human rights.
To a strong round of applause, the representative from one intergovernmental organization of developing countries asserted: "WIPO does not appear to act according to the UN mandate, but according to its original mission to foster IP," a reference to the fact that before obtaining its current agency status, WIPO had been the Office for the Protection of Industrial Property, a body established to administer services for the Paris and Berne Conventions on industrial property and copyright. "The king is naked!" someone in the audience joked, loud enough to be heard, labelling the fact an "inconvenient truth." The accusation was that WIPO cares more for the rights of intellectual property owners than those of users, especially those in developing countries. The collective demand was for WIPO to "change its culture and direction." It should be working in the public interest, giving emphasis to free and open source software, public domain assets like the human genome, and patent exceptions to allow access to medicines for the poor. Humanity stands at a crossroads -a fork in our moral code and a test of our ability to adapt and grow. Will we evaluate, learn and profit from the best of these new ideas and opportunities, or will we respond to the most unimaginative pleas to suppress all of this in favor of intellectually weak, ideologically rigid, and sometimes brutally unfair and inefficient policies? As part of the dynamic of the Assembly, reference was seldom if ever made to someone's personal name. Only member states have seats at the conclave, meaning that individuals personify countries in a ritualized form to such a point that is extremely hard to discover the speaker's actual name.
Neither is this information made readily available in the assembly reports.
The country is the actor delivering the statements. Even backstage, people can be overheard referring directly to one another as a country or a country delegation. In a strongly bureaucratized transnational organization, the fact that the nation state mandate eclipses personhood is very much part of the symbolic repertoire of this unique form of institution, and also a symbolic indicator of its capacity to operate effectively in a wholly impersonal mode. recordings, books, computer software and on-line services are bought and sold because of the information and creativity they contain, not usually because of the plastic, metal or paper used to make them. Many products that used to be traded as low-technology goods or commodities now contain a higher proportion of invention and design in their value -for example brandnamed clothing or new varieties of plants.
[…] The WTO's TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to narrow the gaps in the way these rights are protected around the world, and to bring them under common international rules. It establishes minimum levels of protection that each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members. (Agreement, 1994; World Trade Organization, 2012) Today the term Intellectual Property refers to this new global regime, an umbrella system designed to protect the rights of patent holders (whether corporations or individuals). The processes through which these rights have been redefined have engendered new forms of social coercion and control, including private monopolies on genetic resources and biodiversity, the folk, the local, and social spaces. In other words, the privatization of collective and cultural resources, as well as inventions of public interest, emerges as a powerful strategy for controlling global flows of knowledge and information, and, as a consequence, access to intangible cultural goods and new technologies.
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As many critics have pointed out, intellectual property is not just a regulatory structure defining the right to exploit knowledge and circumscribe creative work, but also a discourse legitimizing the power structures that found the emerging global knowledge economy. For Bourdieu (1998) , the legal field is a site of competition over the monopoly of the right to tell what is right. He points to the fact that supposedly universal practices and discourses are self-referred, or legitimized, within the same legal field that produces them. The social space of producing international law also defines those actors who are allowed into the game, and those who are excluded:
Power is rapidly moving towards sharper hierarchies in the international division of knowledge ownership -ownership of the raw materials, the production cost of which increasingly determines the relative price of goods and services that are exchanged internationally. From now on, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets will be the actual subject of international negotiations. (Cocco 1999: 275) The global knowledge economy, centered on notions of immaterial labor, human capital and intellectual property, establishes a new international division of competences between centers and peripheries, North and South, rich and poor, holders of technology and suppliers of raw materials: "This means that the position of each country will increasingly depend on its capacity to capitalize knowledge, on the possibility of converting knowledge costs into relative prices" (Cocco 1999: 275) . Moreover, although this discussion is beyond our present scope, it is important to recall that the background for such a legal regime involves a philosophical conception of intellectual property that links authorship to ownership. This is a matter of significant debate in anthropology. As Strathern (1996) has put it, property is the legal connection between a being and an entity, which is regarded as the extension of a subject who, in the case of intellectual property, is conceived according to Western canons of the individual (rather than collective) subject.
We can identify three broad sets of knowledge on which intellectual property rights have impinged. These not only configure new markets, they also restructure the daily lives of social actors in relation to these objects: access to information and knowledge; traditional knowledge and intangible cultural heritage; and access to essential public health assets.
The shaping of the global intellectual property regime unfolds within this scenario of deep technical changes and the dominance of corporations that attempt to impose their agendas on everyone else, including those issues that directly affect public interest:
The international extension of patenting reflects both the geographical range of the operation of a company and the importance it attributes to the protection of its monopolistic positions, the rentier extraction of royalties, and the power to sterilize innovation if it so wishes. Large US corporate groups have always attributed paramount importance to this protection. They were the ones to impose the adoption of TRIPS on GATT at the end of the Uruguay Round. (Chesnais 1996: 164) This form of domination, in which knowledge is privately appropriated by corporations, is based on an assumed scarcity of intangible goods and resources, including information, previously understood to be part of the commons. Drahos and Braithwaite (2004) refer to this as a logic of knowledge hegemony, which finds its fullest expression in the current global intellectual property regime. This regime may be understood as a set of institutional, juridical, philosophical and social strategies that enable the exclusive control of resources of virtually any kind. Anthropology, which takes the question of nature/culture as a central theoretical axis, becomes a spectator to how nature or life -to use the discursive terms deployed by intellectual property regulations -becomes culture and, as such, comes to entail authorship or becomes liable to commodification and thus patenting. Fischer (2009: 85-6) noted that "biology has been transformed from a republic of science in which the flow of information, at least in academic settings, was largely free to one in which the biologist always tries to patent before publishing and much data is closely held and no longer freely available." This was exactly the same point made by the Nobel laureate geneticist at the Geneva Conference in 2004, narrated in the first part of this paper.
Intellectual property rights, whether copyright or industrial, are monopolistic strategies designed to secure control over certain objects by certain agents, especially corporations. They are a "dynamic instrument for accessing and controlling markets, to the benefit of industrial companies" that have "enough capital to direct the flow of research and invest in markets created by products and processes, the commercialization of which was made possible by such research" (Ost 1999:81) . According to Halbert (2006) , during the 1950s the power struggle over the regulation of intellectual property rights was manifested in the coexistence of various organizations arbitrating on similar issues. In this context, BIRPI 3 Referring to the production of science and knowledge in Brazil, Carlotto and Ortelado (2010) argue for a specifically peripheral agenda focused on the relationship between science and the market, and looking more closely at editorial activity in order to understand both the economic effects of the products of scientific activity, and the effects of the economy over scientific work.
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Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a series of technical conventions or conferences were constituted to allow governments to exploit common interests without the obligation to adhere to a specific regime. This was the case of the 1865 International Telegraphic Union, the 1874 General Postal Union, and the 1875 International Weights and Measures Office (Almeida 2004 ).
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Although it was not primarily a supplier of technology, Brazil was one of the ten original subscribers to the Convention. Section 301 of the U.S. 1974 Trade and Tariffs Law authorizes the government to unilaterally adopt coercive (tariff and non-tariff ) measures against countries whose practices are considered unfair to U.S. commercial interests. In the following decade, this Law was amended to include, among other changes, the application of Section 301 to intellectual property. During the same period, the United States framed Brazil since the legislation then in force did not cover patenting of pharmaceutics -thus unleashing what became known as the pharmaceutical patents dispute.
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"The MTS includes the ensemble of international agreements signed by states from 1947 onwards to regulate international trade" (Nasser 2003: 33 for an IPR regime less harmful to developing and less developed countries.
Critics of the Intellectual Property regime denounced the narrow and 10 Flexibilities refer, for instance, to the right's term (national frameworks may choose to lengthen the protection term beyond minimal standards), the right's scope (to extend or reduce the scope of patentable objects), and the adoption of specific, clear rules in the education and public health sectors.
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In articles 65 and 66, the Agreement established deadlines for adapting national legal frameworks according to development levels: one year for developed countries; five years for developing countries; and eleven years for less developed countries. An example of this kind of argument can be found in Sherwood (1992) . The author claims that, especially for developing countries like Brazil, IPRs are an indispensable part of the infrastructure necessary for development. "The effective protection of intellectual property will help developing countries to move in two directions. One is towards participation in global technology networks. The other is towards encouraging human creativity within the national economy. The first step towards enjoying these benefits is to think of intellectual property protection as a vital part of the country's infrastructure. […] Intellectual property protection, an inexpensive but powerful instrument, is available to any developing country wishing to benefit from it" (Sherwood 1992: 194-195). efforts in this direction, WIPO must incorporate the specific needs of developing or least developed countries in its programs. The organization must acknowledge "more explicitly the fact that intellectual property protection brings both benefits and costs, and further emphasize the need for IP regimes properly adapted to the specific circumstances in developing countries" (CIPR 2002: 158) . The second line of criticism suggests that the TRIPSplus Agenda, whether in its traditional (bilateral and regional) versions or in WIPO's recent efforts to adopt stricter criteria than TRIPS, 13 poses obstacles to further development and, as such, should not automatically be taken as a necessary part of the system's evolution.
A developmentalist perspective, whose discursive field includes the Development Agenda, therefore emerged to a large extent in opposition to the pro-IPR bias. This set of arguments stems from "a developmentalist view
on Intellectual Property, which should function as a tool for capacity-building […]" rather than being an end in itself (Jaguaribe and Brandelli 2007: 286) .
The developmentalist argument was pursued along two paths simultaneously: on one hand, as a positive and proactive response to the TRIPS-plus negotiations, both at WIPO and through bilateral pressures in free-trade agreements; on the other, as a reaction to the way WIPO had directed negotiations by disregarding policies catering to the demands and needs of developing and least-developed countries. This double characteristic was fundamental during the Agenda negotiation process as a way of deflecting criticisms that the Brazilian Delegation was opposed to IPRs per se or WIPO itself.
In general terms, the developmentalist argument within IPR negotiations highlights the need to balance the benefits and costs of the intellectual property system to ensure the viability of the system itself (Jaguaribe and brought into being. Emphasis was also given to the historical experience of developed countries and how they had deployed IPRs differentially and flexibly during various key periods of their own techno-scientific and industrial development. Also relevant here was the perception that the current configuration of the intellectual property system has failed to benefit developing and less-developed countries in implementing policies for economic, social, cultural and human development.
Care should be taken, however, not to take the processes involved in constructing the Agenda as peaceful and unilinear decision-making by the Brazilian actors involved in constructing the country's stance. An initial fault line can be traced to the scope of the IPRs to be included in the Agenda. On the other hand, these two discursive fields share a common semantic field, which allowed them to collaborate in the construction of a Development Agenda. This includes, first of all, the idea that the social function of intellectual property is not exhausted by the availability of a technique or the creation of products offered to the public. In order for intellectual property to effectively perform its social function, it must be widely available to all social sectors in the form of appropriable knowledge and consumable goods (including culture, knowledge and information). This entails shifting the basic role of IPRs from guaranteeing inalienable individual rights to ensuring the social function of (intangible) property.
Secondly, it becomes imperative to reinstate what was, arguably, the original balance between the monopoly rights afforded by private IPRs and the public interest -the latter understood not only as a formal counterpart to these rights, but also as effective form of participation in the innovation and creativity encapsulated in the objects they protected. In this sense, the introduction of the developmental dimension as further leverage in IPR mechanisms is key to redressing the distortions of a system that has been "hijacked by private interest groups" (in the words of ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe, interviewed in 2008) and that "needs to be calibrated" (according to Maria Beatriz Amorim Páscoa, also in an interview given in 2008).
These concerns lead to one of the Agenda's most controversial items: the scope of the public domain. As a common intermediary space, in Benkler's sense (2007) , the public domain becomes fundamental: it implies a particular frame of governance, involving the use of resources that differ from the current system of private property and based on the impossibility of any kind of private appropriation.
Within the Development Agenda, public domain rules include the limitations on and exceptions to IPRs. These rules are defined by states at two levels: via multilateral agencies, such as WIPO, through the establishment of supranational regulations; and domestically through national public policies and regulatory bodies. In the Agenda's various versions, the issue of the public domain -always a sensitive topic at WIPO and in negotiations in other multilateral and intergovernmental fora -has been the subject of oscillations and controversies fomented by countries such as the United States.
According to the official records available and other kinds of field data, Brazilian diplomats putting forth the country's stances during negotiations have been extremely careful to defuse any idea that they are advocating the abolishment or delegitimization of the intellectual property system per se.
Among the regime's supporters and opponents alike, there is a tacit agreement regarding its existence, legitimacy and importance: what varies is the content and objectives attributed to it.
As we looked to show in the first part of the article, the process of building the legitimacy of the Agenda proposal involved an intense dialogue with and support from non-governmental organizations campaigning in the public interest, many of which were present at its launch in 2004. However it also involved appealing to the UN itself and its founding mission, building support among other multilateral bodies, and receiving the endorsement of regional groups and individual countries. Assembly. Thereafter the tone was set for a dispute between the WIPO Secretariat, which sought to maintain the Agenda within the existing forum, and the Friends of Development group of countries, which began to be referred to simply as 'The Friends,' who were working continually to reinvent its systemic and horizontal profile of governance. At that time, the Group of Friends was developing the Agenda's structure through four thematic teams, whose composition would change during the negotiations until a final version was reached. These displacements, which will not be examined here, eventually led to four groups of propositions: the WIPO mandate and governance; norm-setting; technical cooperation; and technology transfer (Souza 2009 [Although] Pessimists (or realists) might generally predict that more powerful states will ultimately prevail over weaker ones, with the international IP regime maintaining its rights-centered focus.
[…] one more extension of, and infused with, international power relations -a struggle through which developing countries are unlikely to achieve substantial gains. (Bannerman 2008:26) Nevertheless, it cannot go unremarked that while the Agenda was able to unite discontent voices and make a strong claim for change within WIPO's structure, a major leadership crisis became public precisely during the same In our final remarks, we seek to show how, in its very constitution, the Agenda straddles both sides of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) calls the abyssal line. It has been argued that modern law is the most complete form of abyssal thinking: that is, the way through which Western modernity divides sensible and non-sensible objects into those belonging to "this side of the line" and those belonging to "the other side." The Western side of this line is ruled by a dichotomy of regulation and emancipation, the other side by appropriation and violence (Santos 2010) . IPRs, which belong to this side, have been encroaching on an increasing number of objects, prompting a impassioned reanimation of the line. On one hand, it excludes and interdicts, precluding access to a wide range of goods and products located on the other side of the line (in the way, for instance, that public health programs are jeopardized by pharmaceutical patents). On the other hand, it nabs elements from the other side -traditional knowledge, material culture -which, when brought to this side, are subjected to the same rules, thus feeding into the interdiction cycle.
Abyssal thinking, a foundational matrix for thought and classification in Western modernity, is also characterized by the impossibility of existing simultaneously on both sides. To exist on 'this side' implies, necessarily and by definition, to negate, exclude and eliminate -if anything, to domesticate -whatever belongs to the other side.
In this sense, a multiplicity of legal systems and ways of defining which elements belong to the sphere of law not only escape the official framework, they are converted into non-legal or illicit acts, condemned to invisibility or illegality. The traditional cruelty of colonial regimes is revamped under the empire of Law, whether through the plundering of traditional knowledge and its transformation into a commodity, or by submitting groups to the official legal framework as the only viable means to safeguard their autonomy and protect their cultural particularities.
The proposal of a Development Agenda for WIPO is an endeavor to make this line more porous, albeit in a controlled manner. It is, in a sense, an attempt to render visible some elements from the other side, fostering the emergence of authorial, collaborative experiences that differ from the monopolistic-commercial logic of IPRs. The qualification 'some' is important here: not all elements from the other side are desirable, only those that can be domesticated and framed according to preexisting ways of distributing power and knowledge. This is manifested, for example, in the limitations imposed on the participation of non-governmental organizations in this process. Even if their presence is desired, their contributions regarded as fundamental, and their support deemed necessary, there is a clear separation between these actors, who are authorized to denounce and propose, and others, more authoritative and legitimate, who manage the contending interests and ultimately define the Agenda's master guidelines.
From this stems the second process of approximation: the similarly controlled attempt to recruit the dissident voices of historically silenced political minorities to this side of the line during the Agenda-building process. In a complex process that lies beyond our present scope, indigenous peoples, patient groups, academics, consumers groups, counter-cultural movements and anti-globalization movements are invited to participate in the construction of the new Agenda. They are recruited however on the basis not of their specificity, but their exoticism. As such, they must to some extent conform to the formal ritual acts that grant access to these instancesin particular, the idea of representation.
As stated above, the abyssal line is not a one-way process of incorporating elements from the other side. There are also increasingly qualified countermovements: experiences of subaltern cosmopolitanism which press for a non-abyssal form of thinking, based "on the notion that the world's diversity is inexhaustible" (Santos 2010: 51) . In the case of IPRs, this means, for instance, seriously considering legal systems in which notions of property find no equivalent in our philosophy, or legal systems based on other logics of production, appropriation and distribution of (re)creative activity. These 'others' can be found not only on the 'difference' pole formed by indigenous peoples, peasants or traditional communities: they are also encountered at the center and margins of this side of the line, pushing for visibility and challenging the hegemony of abyssal thinking.
It is in this sense that the process for negotiating and approving a Development Agenda for WIPO -or, more precisely, at WIPO -is paradoxical. On one hand, it shows the political muscle of a heterogeneous group of social actors capable of tipping the balance of power in the international intellectual property regime. On the other, it points to the consolidation of the legal intellectual property regime as something to a greater or lesser extent 'necessary' for the countries' development. In the first case, there is a counter-movement, an attempt to push and smooth the abyssal lines that constitute our world. On the other, there is a re-entrenchment of this line, since ultimately the existence of the regime itself is not at stake. Its content and pillars are questioned, but a consensus remains regarding its existence and reality -and what is more, its inevitability. Hence, even with the openings achieved by the Development Agenda, no substantial changes have been made to the configuration of forces. In fact, after the earlier moments of turmoil, the situation has settled in such a way that it has again become clear
